

# To block or not to block

**CSNOG** 

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## Why it's important for you?

Russian Federation pretended to be "Western Democracy"

Everything happened are done by the Rule of Law (Putin is a lawyer, by education)

So written laws, bylaws, instructions can be bad example even for democratic countries



## "Protection of youth"

First content blocking regulation - who can object protection of the children?

"Blue Whale" - media preparation

Promise to block content only for the purposes of children protection, only by the closed list of cases "drugs", "suicide propaganda", "sexual abuse images"



#### How it should work

- 1) Designated agency finds harmful information
- RosKomNadzor Regulator keeps registry and tries to contact resource owner to request removal
- 3) If not removed, related metadata (IP, name, URI) is offloaded to (licensed) network operator to be blocked.
- 4) In case of harmful information removed, resource may be requested to be removed from the list

"blocked" was not defined in the beginning



## Is blockings effective? (by statistics)

NO.

Child suicide rate - increased.

Drug related crimes - increased.

Child abuse images - increased.


LGBT perception by youth - improved

But in number of resources blocked - very effective: ~25000 suicidal resources (in 2021 only) of ~590000 "harmful" (4mln all times)



#### More to be blocked

- copyright infringement
- terrorist propaganda
- more "information harmful for children"
- online alchogol sales
- gambling
- ..
- poaching



First "terrorists" appears to be Kasparov and Navalny

But blocking is not effective against them

Spiral of regulations increasing obligations and responsibility of operators, addition of new regulatory subjects (search engines, news aggregation, information distribution intermediaries (OPII), messengers, VPN services, ...)



## "The Auditor" (Ревизор)

System to monitor effectiveness of blockings by operators

(there is no recommendations on how to block, and there is no information on how such system works)

Fines for operators (> 500 euro per non-blocked resource)



## Trolling and abuse (from both sides)

Specially crafted resources ("100 ways to commit suicide", "LGBT propaganda for boys and girls")

Information abort something illegal considered to be illegal itself (Wikipedia pages requested be removed or blocked)

Technical abuse by blocked resources of trolls

Abuse of non-public part of the resources to be blocked

#### Telegram war



## Is blockings effective? (in technical means)

#### NO

Real abuser can easily move to the other resource

Collateral damage

More failures points and load to the network (from ENOG2017 <u>Deep Packet Inspection Challenges</u>)

#### **Telegram War**

Technical community opinion (on public discussion platforms - ignored)



## In Czech Republic

- gambling
- drugs

Lists are open and relatively short, still no common list

There are recommendations

No enforcement and control methods or responsibility of operators (yet?)

Is it effective?

EU regulation



## More repressive regulations in Russia

SORM (bulk wiretapping, kind of Lawful Intercept)

More subjects of regulation

Obligatory user identification

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**Sovereign Internet** (with fully state-run blockings)

combination with other repressive legislation



## Za naszą i waszą wolność

## За нашу и вашу свободу

For our freedom and yours

Za naši i vaši svobodu

Fyrir frelsi okkar og þitt

Für unsere Freiheit und deine

### Free Moscow University





## https://freemoscow.university

Educates things no longer available in official education in Russia

#### Courses on:

Constitutional Law, Human Rights, Journalism, Internet Governance,...



## Questions?

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