




Quad9

Quad9:

A Free, Secure
DNS Resolver

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


**The Domain Name System (DNS) is
the “phone book” of the Internet.
It translates domain names like
`www.example.org` into Internet
Protocol addresses, like `192.0.2.89`.**

So What are the Problems with this System?



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


So What are the Problems with this System?



PII = \$\$\$\$

www.example.org



PII constitutes a rich “click trail” of information about the user’s browsing history, email, all of the software on their computer that’s checking for updates, and all of the malicious software that’s infected their machine.


So What are the Problems with this System?



Even when users are already using recursive resolvers that are broadly anycast, the failure of a local node often results in users' queries being backhauled to other continents.



So What are the Problems with this System?

The maximum performance a user can receive is limited by the distance between the user and the recursive resolver: the further away, the slower the user's performance will be.



So What are the Problems with this System?

When a recursive resolver has a “cache miss” performance takes another huge hit as the resolver begins querying authoritative servers that are far away and potentially slow to respond.



www.example.org


Many commercial recursive resolver operators intentionally pass user IP address information onward to authoritative server operators.

So What are the Problems with this System?

As the recursive resolver continues to query authoritative servers, the performance degrades still further.




**recursive
resolver**



www.example.org

**.org
nameserver**



example.org
nameserver



root
nameserver




Any authoritative nameserver in the recursion chain which fails to provide cryptographic authentication of the DNS data (DNSSEC) precludes the authentication of any domain names further downstream.

So What are the Problems with this System?

Every additional authoritative server in the chain is another potential weak link which could be compromised and caused to provide malicious data to the end user.



**recursive
resolver**




root
nameserver



.net
nameserver



**example.org
nameserver**




www.example.org

Attacks against authoritative servers can leave recursive resolvers unable to obtain answers on users' behalf.

So What are the Problems with this System?


Recursive resolvers leak far more information to authoritative servers than is necessary to answer queries. In this example, a query to a Root nameserver need not include the "www.example" portion of the domain name.



**root
nameserver**



**net
nameserver**




**example.org
nameserver**



Many authoritative nameserver operators monetise click-trail information by collecting and selling recordings of network traffic collected between the recursive servers and their authoritative servers.


Quad9: Collaboration Between Internet Industry Leaders




GLOBAL
CYBER
ALLIANCE




How does Quad9 protect you?



How does Quad9 protect you?



How does Quad9 protect you?



How does Quad9 protect you?



www.random_malware.example



www.random_malware.example

**Quad9 recursive
resolver**

NXDOMAIN

on average Quad9 “blocks” 2.2m malware requests daily





Quad9

North America	28
South America	12
Europe	16
Africa	24
Asia	15
Pacific	5

Total Operational Today ~~100~~
121

179+
~~100~~ physically deployed already today
More than 150 in operation by end of 2018



Quad9

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www.quad9.net